The Challenge of Militancy and Terrorism to Leadership and Development in Nigeria

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Abstract

Terrorism in Nigeria manifested itself strongly in the garb of Boko haram insurgents which started as an insignificant agitation of an Islamic sect with a strange commitment to non-conformist standards of social organization in Muslim-dominated Bauchi and Borno states. Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws of Islam as set out in the Koran. Qualitative method of data collection was used for this study which includes journals, articles, and internet sources. Findings indicate that Nigerian leadership has not lived up to its socio-economic responsibilities. Therefore, the implications of militancy and terrorists' operations include the slowdown of the country's economic growth and development, worsened unemployment, food scarcity due to the inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South due to insecurity. Politically and economically, the blame hinges on leadership failure. We consider that the government should embark on social welfare programmes and education, like the Almajiri education policy in the North in order to de-radicalize the youths and counter their violent extremist ideology. Other solution includes; tackling unemployment, persistent poverty and social inequality, creating a viable welfare policy, end to political exploitation and adequate socialization in proper ideology by religious leaders to avert constant blood-letting in the name of religion. The relative deprivation theory as argued by Robert Merton was used to explain militancy and terrorist activities in Nigeria.

Key words: Challenge, Development, Leadership, Militancy, Terrorism.

Le défi de l'activisme et du terrorisme pour le leadership et le développement au Nigeria

Abstrait
Le terrorisme au Nigéria s'est manifesté avec force dans la tenue des insurgés Boko haram qui a commencé comme une agitation insignifiante d'une secte islamique avec un engagement étrange envers des normes d'organisation non-conformistes d'organisation sociale dans les États de Bauchi et Borno à domination musulmane. Contrairement aux militants du delta du Niger qui étaient motivés par des objectifs purement économiques, Boko Haram est animé par une inclination à la conviction religieuse, des aspirations politiques et des pratiques sociales. Son objectif ultime est de faire du Nigéria un État islamique et de ne respecter que les lois de l'islam énoncées dans le Coran. Une méthode qualitative de collecte de données a été utilisée

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pour cette étude, qui comprend des revues, des articles et des sources Internet. Les résultats indiquent que les dirigeants nigérians n'ont pas assumé leurs responsabilités socio-économiques. Par conséquent, le militantisme et les activités terroristes ont notamment pour conséquences le ralentissement de la croissance et du développement économiques du pays, l'aggravation du chômage, la pénurie alimentaire due à l'incapacité des commerçants de transporter des denrées alimentaires du nord au sud en raison de l'insécurité. Politiquement et économiquement, le blâme repose sur l'échec du leadership. Nous estimons que le gouvernement devrait s'engager dans des programmes de protection sociale et d'éducation, comme la politique d'éducation Almajiri dans le Nord, afin de dé-radicaliser les jeunes et de contrer leur idéologie extrémiste violente. Autre solution comprend; lutter contre le chômage, la pauvreté persistante et les inégalités sociales, créer une politique de protection sociale viable, mettre un terme à l'exploitation politique et à la socialisation adéquate dans une idéologie appropriée par les chefs religieux afin d'éviter des saignements constants au nom de la religion. La théorie de la privation relative avancée par Robert Merton a été utilisée pour expliquer le militantisme et les activités terroristes au Nigéria.

Mots clés: défi, développement, leadership, militantisme, terrorisme,

Introduction
Nigeria is ravaged by underdevelopment, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, lack of basic social amenities, corruption, increased cost of living, and gross inequality. All these have instigated grievances against the system and created breeding ground for militancy and terrorism. If these issues are squarely addressed, there is the possibility that terrorism will not be attractive to the future generation. Duru (2012, pp.162-170). The militants launched attacks on the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Chevron and Total-Final Elf staff and facilities. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) killed oil workers at Chevron, Total-Final Elf (TFE), damaged a rescue helicopter sent to rescue employees, killed naval officers, injured soldiers, and attacked police stations like the Rumu-Okoro, Elenlenwo and killed some officers on duty, attacked fivestar hotels, and carried out a bomb attack on the Eagle Square, Abuja on October 1, 2010 during the fifty year anniversary of independence.

The Boko Haram insurgency started as an insignificant agitation of an Islamic sect with a strange commitment to non-conformist standards of social organization in Muslim-dominated Bauchi and Borno states. It began in Bauchi State on July 26, 2009 and since that time, the group has extended its activities to other Northern states as well as to other parts of Nigeria. Unlike the militants in the Niger Delta that were driven by purely economic goals, Boko Haram is driven by proclivity in religious conviction, political aspirations and social practice. Specifically, its ultimate goal is to make Nigeria an Islamic State and uphold only the laws as set out in the Koran (Walker, 2012). This group believes that Islam detests western education is blasphemous. The recruits of the sect are mostly youths from the northern parts of Nigeria that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social status quo. They include unemployed youths and refugees from neighbouring African countries. Thus, the sect explores the social-economic negativities of the country to recruit and radicalize its members (Nicolle, 2011, pp.1-3).

More importantly is the strong link the group has with other transnational extremist groups, including Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda (Imobighe, 2006). Boko haram's relationship with other transnational militant groups as noted by (Ogbonnaya, Ufiem and Ehigiamusoe, 2013, pp.46-60) includes training, funding, providing intelligence on planning, tactical attacks and activities, ideological influence and human power resources This work will therefore focus on

the challenges posed by militancy and terrorism on the economic, social, cultural, psychological and National development in Nigeria through the provision of quality leadership.

Methodology
Qualitative research method was used for this study. We analysed journals, newspapers, and internet publications on the Niger Delta militants and terrorist groups in Nigeria. The concerns were to examine the leadership shortcomings and the challenges or implications it poses to the crises in Nigeria; and on the basis of these make concrete recommendations for tackling the challenges.

Literature Review and Conceptual Explanation

Militancy
The militancy concept was gleaned from the famous 1963 speech to the March on Washington of Martin Luther King, Jr. wherein he explicitly espoused 'the marvelous new militancy' of the anti-racist struggle of those years. In sensitizing the American public to what he called 'the fierce urgency of Now,' King (1963) contrasted his brand of militant tactic favourably with 'the tranquillizing drug of gradualism' that plagued the more reformist wing of the movement. By 1968, the year of his death, King's radicalism and openness to militant forms of protest had, by all accounts, only intensified. Yet, in his final speech, on the night before his assassination, he reiterated his longstanding view that "we don't need any bricks and bottles, we don't need any Molotov cocktails" King (1968). The dialectical tussle about how to reconcile the conflicting views thus ensues.

Militancy, according to D'Arcy (2011), referred to any action or activity that is grievance-motivated, adversarial, confrontational, and collectively carried out. Militancy is 'grievance-motivated' in the sense that it is neither solely recreational nor solely opportunistic, but is rather motivated in some large part by a desire to protest against something, to press demands for change. A militant action is 'adversarial' in the sense that its targets are not treated by the protesters as potential allies or partners, open to being convinced or won over, but rather as intransigent adversaries, to be pressured and if possible defeated by means of struggle. Militancy is 'confrontational' given that, rather than avoiding conflict and seeking accommodation and compromise, it seeks to initiate or intensify conflict. According to King (1963) militancy seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue". Militancy is a 'collectively carried out' action because it is not performed by individuals acting alone, but by participants in social struggles, acting in concert with their fellow protesters. Therefore, militancy in summary is any form of grievance-motivated, adversarial and confrontational collective action.

Terrorism
The word, terror, notes Tilly (2007), points to a widely recurrent but imprecisely bounded political strategy defined as "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime". For him, terror as a strategy ranges from (a) intermittent actions by members of groups that are engaged in wider political struggles to (b) one segment in the modus operandi of durably organized specialists in coercion, including government-employed and government-backed specialists in coercion to (c) the dominant rationale for distinct, committed groups and networks of activists. In trying to identify salient characteristics of terror, Hoffman (2006 p. 22) proposes that terrorism is "ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent – or, equally important, threatens violence designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target"; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no

uniform or identifying insignia); and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity. Ruby (2002 p.10) noted that the US State Department defines terrorism as "politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience"

Development
Development has a dynamic connotation and refers to a process of change, growth, progress or evolution. Although originally used to connote a process of societal change, the term 'development' has been primarily linked to economic modernisation in the developing countries after the Second World War, where it was originally defined as involving growth and industrialisation. This definition has now been broadened to connote a multifaceted process that comprises social, cultural, gender, and political, environmental as well as economic dimensions. A more applicable definition was given by Rodney (1986) who insisted that there is development when an individual's ability is put to conquer his environment and utilize it to his advantage. He persisted that such process must follow the development of tools, skills and mobilization of required resources for development purposes. Hence, he defined development as increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material wellbeing depending on the age in which one lives, one's class origins and personal code of what is right and what is wrong.

Causes of Militancy and Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism may arise as a result of people's historical experience, as consequence of deprivation, wars, natural/man-made calamities, domination, and inequities. Domestic terrorism has arisen in Nigeria because emergent militant groups have taken advantage of governments' inefficient actions and inactions in dealing with the fundamental elements of nationhood namely, internal security, resource control/injustice, corruption/ethnicism, sycophancy/favoritism, and over-lordship/marginalization. It is pertinent to add that while some of the terror groups have been settled, others have suffocated and crashed out or outlawed. Yet a few of them are still hibernating, waiting for a good opportunity to erupt violence (Obioma, 2014).

The causes of terrorism can also be traceable to the 'resource curse' which originated but is not limited to the Middle East, where all oil-rich countries are either authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, and many of them experience periodic waves of civil violence and terrorism. Oil-rich Nigeria has long ranked among the top countries in terms of exposure to petroleum-related terrorism (Lia & Kjøk 2004). It also suffers from most of the maladies associated with Third World petro-modernization 'ecological catastrophe, social deprivation, political marginalization, and a rapacious company capitalism in which unaccountable foreign transnationals are granted a sort of immunity by the state' (Watts 2001, p.196).

Terrorism can be said to represent the indiscriminate and random use of different levels of violence against an opponent or the ancillary interests of such an opponent, with whom one has adversarial relationship in order to strike fear on the latter and impose one's will on it, or tailor its actions towards a desired goal. The illicit diamond trade has been used to finance a number of insurgent and terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida and Hizbullah.

The underlying issues of contention by the armed militant groups were the greater control of the oil resources in the Niger Delta region by the people, fair allocation of the revenue from oil exploitation, ending the oil spills and gas flaring, compensation for the decades of ecocide, as well as the physical and infrastructural development of the region. However, the Nigerian government saw their protests as acts of sabotage to the revenue generation of the nation (Cyril, 2008). Well-known among the belligerent groups operational in the South-South were the

Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by AlhajiAsariDokubo, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Martyrs Brigade, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, among others (Duru, 2012pp.162-170).

Incidentally, while the amnesty for, and rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants were beginning to take shape in the country, the Boko Haram uprising began. Despite the seemingly prevailing calmness of the Niger Delta region at the time, as regards the issues of terrorism, the outstanding issues of resource control and allocation, poverty alleviation and environmental security remain potential sources of worry and concern. Aside the basic problems outlined above, other causes of militancy in the region included marginalization, abject poverty, massive unemployment, destruction of aquatic ecosystem, the alteration of the soil quality, air pollution, and socio-economic disorganization (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Egwuonwu, 2012, pp.23-37). The group has since 2009 existed with known preferences in religious belief and social practices.

However, Eso (2011, p.11) observed that the root causes of violence and criminality is rather deep-seated and beyond the sectarian. Awonyemi, (2012) submitted that beginning from 1987 to the controversial introduction of Sharia penal system by some states in the north in 2000, some political leaders have laid the foundation for extremist sects to emerge through religious manipulation which coupled with widespread illiteracy, poverty and a weak leadership, has since allowed a terrorist group like Boko Haram to emerge. Also, Harrington, (2012, p. 24) argued that the current insecurity is worsened or aided by the high level of poverty in the northern region in particular and Nigeria in general. Others have contended that violence in the north is orchestrated by the betrayal of peoples trust in government. The US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Terence McCulley, the betrayal of the people by the different levels of government and the low level of governments' presence provided criminals and terrorists a platform to launch insurrection being witnessed across northern Nigeria (Benjamin, Ogunmola, Joseph & Ibrahim, 2012).

Thus, the Boko Haram phenomenon has a deep economic root more than any other perspectives from which the investigating intelligence can suggest. These realities are much more obvious in rural areas. A factual indicator is the result of the Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey published by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2012 which showed that the North scored badly and accounted for the large proportion of Nigerians living in poverty Awoyemi (2012). As such what we are witnessing in Nigeria is leadership failure where the government is overwhelmed by the insurgence.

Leadership Failure in Fighting Militancy and Insurgency in Nigeria
The mind-set of united Nigeria and the need for unity in diversity are usually lost in the face of terror and oppression of a group. This attitude of sectarianism, coupled with the weak and slow response of the Nigerian government *ab intio*, was what probably gave an impetus to the insurgency and its metamorphosis into a mainstream terrorist organization. The rest of Nigeria has however, come to realise that the terror group is indeed a threat to the security, sovereignty and stability of the Nigerian State and not just the North. Adibe (2012) captured the profundity of the challenge the Nigerian State faces when he argued that, the state:

> is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram's bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting. Organized labour, inducing university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists

accept 'brown envelops' to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is not only unfair to them, but is an outright enemy.

The tenacity of events between 2011 and 2014 revealed that the Nigerian State has not effectively equipped it security institutions with 21st century equipment and that it has not given its military personnel the requisite training for the much needed capacity to defend the country from internal insurrections and external threats. Furthermore, the government has not lived up to its responsibility in handling these challenges and ensuring security. Militancy in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram have thus facilitated and aggravated the irony of sectional indifference. During the heightened militancy in the Niger Delta, the North did not care much about the fate of the victims and not until the increasing terror of the Boko Haram in Nigeria did the rest of the country began to be worried about the amount of terror in the Northern part. Enormous lives and properties unquantifiable in economic terms have been lost before the government woke up to address the menace of terrorism.

Though the Federal Government engaged development partners, including the United States (US), European Union (EU) and Israel, to step-up the war against terror, the psyche of Nigerians have been destroyed. Nigeria also got proposals of assistance from Britain, Canada, China, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN, to assist locate the over 234 abducted Chibok secondary school girls in Borno. The US, France, Pakistan, and Britain have also offered to assist with counter-terrorism training (Ajayi, Igbintade, Ukpong & Otokpa, 2014)

Akande (2014) maintained that the Nigerian military is highly unmotivated while the insurgents have higher morale than the Nigerian troops because they are more organized and have more sophisticated weapons. Also, the US Department of Defence has recently provided funds to Nigeria for the development of a counter-terrorism infantry unit (US Embassy in Nigeria, 2014).One of the basic factors for high morale is moral and financial inventive. A situation in which soldiers are placed on half salary, are tried in a General Court Martial for every act and are allegedly buried in mass graves or the superiors give them wrong orders that end up in disastrous offensives that lead to their ambush, as have been widely reported in the ongoing war on terror in Nigeria. Such acts will kill the spirit of the armed forces and culminate in strings of losses. The welfare of military personnel should be considered so that they can be dedicated to their job and not be vulnerable to corrupt practices.

Social class awareness and consciousness equally have the potential for conflict generation. A society where the middle class is small with an equally small or smaller upper class is prone to dangerous conflict. The resultant effect is that such a society is usually characterised by great instability. This is because the lower class looks at the upper class with envy. This feeling is pervasive in many parts of Nigeria. Inequality results in bitterness, and bitterness generates envy and hate. This is true across the entire political spectrum in Nigeria, at the national, state and local government levels. The middle class are a population which in every society attains a certain point of social contentment and thus indifference. The critical estimation of the upper class by the lower class is often occasioned by hardship, suffering and the desire to be upwardly mobile (Muzan, 1999). Unfortunately, those who are worst afflicted with this type of feelings are those who have received some education and yet are bereft of a means of income.
Indeed, when people are satisfied, as is often the case with professionals, they need not be very rich like the upper class.

Implications of Militancy and Terrorism on Economic, Social and Cultural Development of Nigeria

The implications of Boko Haram's operation include the slowdown of the country's economic growth and development, worsened unemployment, food scarcity due to the inability of traders to transport food from the North to the South. However, the insurgency itself has dented Nigeria's public image, increased fear and brings about a false sense of security, recourse to self-help by people and citizens on most occasions such as the emergence of "Civilian JTF in Borno", loss of life and damage to properties (Alao, Atere & Alao, 2012, p.67).

Culturally, socially and psychologically, Cameron and McCormic (1954) have examined the problem of insecurity generally from various perspectives and pointed out nine of them but I will mention only fourwhich are believed to be caused by frustration and neurosis (Cameron and McCormic (1954, p. 559) that concerns this study, namely; insecurity as emotional response to sudden external threats from within, insecurity from a relatively constant threatening external situation, insecurity due to threat from within; and insecurity as a function of beliefs, especially religious beliefs. These traits are all characteristics of the boko haram militants who hide under the guise of religion to vent their anger and frustration at the leadership of the country for neglecting them.

The Theory of Relative Deprivation

Deprivation means that people who are deprived of things deemed valuable in society, whether money, justice, status or privilege. They join social movements with the hope of redressing their grievances. This is a beginning point for looking at why people join social movements; however, it is even more important to look at relative deprivation theory, a belief that people join social movement based on their evaluations of what they think they should have compared with what others have. On the contrary, absolute deprivation is people's actual negative condition; relative deprivation is what people think they should have relative to what others have, or even compared with their own past or perceived future. Improved conditions fuel human desires for even better conditions, and thus can spark revolutions.

American Sociologist Merton (1938) was among the first (if not the first) to use the concept of relative deprivation in order to understand social deviance, using French sociologist Emile Durkheim's concept of anomie as a starting point. In one of the first formal definitions of the relative deprivation, Runciman (1966) noted that there are four preconditions of relative deprivation (of object X by person A):

Person A does not have X
Person A knows of other persons that have X
Person A wants to have X
Person A believes obtaining X is realistic

Part of what makes terrorism so terrorizing is our inability to rationalize such extreme acts of violence and often self-sacrifice. What circumstances other than pure desperation could drive a person to become a terrorist? The rationale behind the idea that terrorists are desperate seems logical; rational choice theorists, at least, would posit that if a person is willing to risk his or life and/or freedom to commit an act of terrorism, he must have few preferable alternatives. Although academics from various disciplines have focused their attention on answering this question, researchers have offered no conclusive explanation.

Theoretically, the militant and terrorist activities can be explained using the relative deprivation paradigm as put forward by Gurr (1970) who suggests that collective violence emerges as a result of relative deprivation. Specifically, he holds that "the greater the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective violence. Gurr's

relative deprivation "is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (p. 24). It is the gap between that "to which people believe they are rightfully entitled" and that which "they think they are capable of getting and keeping". It is essential to note that deprivation is not based on wants or needs alone, but on the wants and needs that we feel we ought to have or deserve.

Most of us want a million dollars, but in Gurr's theory few of us will feel that we have been deprived, since we do not believe we are rightfully entitled to this sum. The person denied a promotion he wants and feels he deserves will be deprived; the person denied a promotion he wants but feels he does not deserve will not be deprived. Hence, political violence as the result of collective discontent arising from a discrepancy between expected and achieved welfare can also be identified in two key components in Marx's (1847) paradigm. First, is that conflict is a common and ongoing feature of society. Second, is that society is made up of two main groups or classes (the haves and the have-not) with conflicting values and interests. Hence, feelings of deprivation are relative, as they come from a comparison to social norms that are not absolute and usually differ from time and place. This differentiates relative deprivation from objective deprivation (also known as absolute deprivation or absolute poverty), a condition that applies to all underprivileged people. This leads to an important conclusion: while the objective deprivation (poverty) in the world may change over time, relative deprivation will not, as long as social inequality persists and some humans are judged to be better off than others.

In Nigeria, the leadership, who constitutes the ruling elites and the bourgeoisie who come mainly from members of the political, economic, cultural and traditional classes or elites own all the wealth in society. They also own and control the means of production and distribution in the society. These classes appropriate all the wealth of society, while the proletariats are hired as political thugs, election riggers and security guards for use during electioneering campaigns. The unfortunate fact of the matter, is that immediately after the elections, these so called political thugs are done away with and left to perpetuate havoc (armed robbery, kidnapping and assassinations) in the society. Rackham (1932) shows that the failure of members of the political class coupled with the failure of political elites to deliver on their social and economic campaign promises have led many youths to become ready tools in the hands of jihadists and Al Qaeda militant groups.

Discussion of Findings

The connection between human frustration and political violence was recognized in ancient times, and it is essential in Aristotle's classical theory of revolution. Later, these mechanisms were discussed both in Tocqueville's work on revolution and in Freud's early writings. These theories connect individual mobilization of aggression and political violence to social, economic and political circumstances (Wiberg 1990). Dollard et al. (1939) first assumed that aggressive behavior always originated in frustration. Later, Galtung (1964) argued that the situation most likely to provoke aggressive behavior is one in which individuals find themselves in a state of disequilibrium along various socio-political dimensions of status.

Davies (1962; 1973), on the other hand, claimed that the probability of violent conflict is highest when improvements, either economic or political, increase the individual's expectations, only to be followed by a general deterioration, thus decreasing the ability to satisfy accustomed needs and expectations. This hypothesis is illustrated in the well-known 'Davies' J-Curve' (Davies 1962, p. 69). It is argued that tension based on the perception of deprivation is the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence. The line of argument follows the so-called 'DFA-linkage': deprivation produces frustration, which eventually turns into aggression against the state. Deprivation may be absolute, or alternatively, it may be relative, produced by an increasing gap between expectations and satisfaction. It may also be relative in the sense that some social or ethnic groups are more affected than the general

populace. Systematic studies find support for deprivation theories both at the micro- and macro-levels of society (Gurr 1970).

The relative deprivation theory also seems valid for terrorism, particularly so for political deprivation. Lai (2004) finds a strong positive relationship between political inequality of minority groups within a state, and terrorism in that state. Economic measures of average individual deprivation were found to be insignificant. 'Social distance' and terrorism. Recent studies have used sociological theories of violence and social geometry to explain the occurrence of 'pure' or mass casualty terrorism. The point of departure is that long-standing grievances alone cannot explain extreme violence. Hence, one needs to identify the sociological interrelationships between the terrorists, their grievances, and their enemies or the 'social geometry' of the actors (Black 2004, p. 18). Terrorism also has an upward direction; terrorist attacks are directed against targets symbolizing the central government, a dominant enemy regime, or a socio-economically or politically superior community.

Thus, terrorism represents in a sense 'social control from below' (Black 2004, p. 19).Just as is the case in Nigeria, Boko-haram's attacks on police stations and the police headquarters symbolizes its attack on social control from below. This aligns with Black's assertion that terrorism in its purest form 'arises inter-collectively and upwardly across long distances in multidimensional social space.

Solution to Militancy and Terrorism in Nigeria

The middle class in any society is usually the natural medium of effective communication, contact and information transmission between the lower and upper classes. Where this wire of transmission is too thin, fragile or non-existent, a given society is inviting turbulent mass action, a revolution (Arndt, 1963). The Niger Delta, the settler situations in Jos and, perhaps, the Boko Haram movement all evoke issues of inequality in Nigeria. Davies (2008) summed up the situation in the word of Aristotle who argued that "the cure and prevention of the conflict that is occasioned by relative deprivation lies in the quality of goodness and justice', available in the country. This was corroborated by Lipset (1963) that the theoretical basis and the practical outcomes envisioned by Aristotle apply to all societies and all periods of human history. What Aristotle wrote two and a half millennia ago are applicable in today's world. Indeed, it is inevitable that there is bound to be an upheaval in any unequal social class structure middle class, there is a breeding ground for revolts, anarchy and revolution (Baker, 1958).

Discrimination comes in a variety of forms. One example is economic discrimination, which is defined as the systematic exclusion, whether prescriptive or de facto, of a person or group from participating in positions or activities of higher economic value, such as employment, trade or profession. Another form is political discrimination, which is defined as a systematic or perceivable pattern of limitations in the form, process, normative or practical outcome of the opportunities of groups to take part in political activities or to attain or keep elite positions of trust (Muzan, 1999).

There is also discrimination in the distribution of political and socio-economic goods to populations or segments of the population of a country. This type of discrimination often results in deprivation of basic infrastructural amenities and diminished opportunities for employment, particularly at the upper echelons of governance and economic activities. Ethnic minorities are often victims of this type of discrimination and it has often led to movements of terrorism and insurgency. This type of discrimination was the primary motive force behind the realignment of the erstwhile warring forces of the Ijaw, Itselkiri and Urhobo in Warri, Delta State against the federal government in the Niger Delta insurgency.

In the Niger Delta before the emergence of the insurgency, there was a widespread feeling of deprivation and discrimination, since the evidence showed that the rate of unemployment, the general standards of living and the rate of poverty in the region were clearly

disproportionate to other parts of the country and clearly worse than the national average. This was reinforced byCollier (1981) that the fact that high positions of trust in the oil companies were filled by members of the majority tribes, some of whom were not necessarily more qualified than those who were unemployed

It has been noted elsewhere that 'among several other ills, poverty breeds anger, hatred, envy and conflict'. Hence, (Muzan, 1999) observed that poverty is the cause of many of Nigeria's problems. The phenomenon of poverty has been recognised from ancient times. Euripides (1984) recognised it in early Greek times thatthe peasant war was the culmination of revolutionary trends which shaped much German social history from the seventeenth century forward, such that Engels (1966) noted that though local insurrections of peasants can be found in mediaeval times in large numbers, not one general national peasant revolt, can be observed before the peasant war which came about when the lowest stratum of the population, the one exploited by all the rest, arose, namely, the plebeians and the peasants.

Gurr (1968: 25) discovered that persistent poverty, particularly in the midst of economic growth and affluence of the upper class, has led to feelings of frustration among the Nigerian poor. It will also breed hatred, mistrust and anger. These psychological monsters lead to a loss of faith in the system, alienation and hopelessness. At the stage of hopelessness, there is a progressive, psychological diminution of the value of life, which eventually leads to a point of indifference between life and death. Hence, Thomas (1980, p. 40) maintains that hostility, antagonistic conduct and indiscriminate aggression manifest rather spontaneously and automatically without restraint.

Mailafia (2012, p. 125) summed up the situation as follows: "the prevalence of poverty makes it easier for extremist groups to mobilize disenchanted mobs in pursuit of their own political goals". In Northern Nigeria, where over 70 per cent of the population lives under the internationally-defined poverty line, it is easy to see how any demagogue or religious extremist can mobilise the poor and destitute as instruments for his own political goals. There is the added factor of youth unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging.

From this description and many similar analyses of the Nigerian situation, we can categorically assert that poverty breeds conflict and induces susceptibility to terrorist activity in Nigeria. Poverty is based on the lack of basic needs, and the more this lack persists, the greater the likelihood that a situation of frustration will arise which, if not checked in time, will lead to aggression and revolutionary conduct. The national average of unemployment in Nigeria stands at 24 per cent, with an estimated 54 per cent of the youth population unemployed IBRD (2009). Hence, an unemployed person, like a poor person, is usually unhappy. The idleness created by unemployment can lead to antisocial conduct to occupy time. Even if the person is educated and skilled, it can lead to frustration, aggression and serious conflict. In itself, unemployment is, of course, a very potent cause of poverty. This is why employment is a necessary component of a basic needs strategy of development, both as a means and also as an end. The benefits of employment are hardly contestable. Employment yields an output and provides an income to the employed, and it gives the employed person the recognition of being engaged in some occupation worth his while and dignity. Mere employment does not, however, by itself satisfy all the requirements of the mind that would remove the psychological preconditions that lead to social unrest. Ikein (1993) reiterates the needs for government to improve the quality of employment and conditions of work. Most persons would not consider themselves happily employed if the employment they are engaged in is demoralising, undignified, inconvenient, dangerous to health or to life, or indeed discriminatory as to gender, ethnicity, race, age, and religion.

Recommendations

Nigerians are very religious people hence both religion and ideology are closely-related concepts in the minds of individuals and social groups. In their pure form, they have universalistic attributes, appealing primarily to the primordial instincts. The belief system will largely affect the social processes in the particular society and, indeed, institutions and human relations. Thus, any focus on underlying causes, motivating factors, and grievances, implies a kind of justification for violence. Also, the socialization and social stratification process or a society's ranking of individual members within the society, including issues of equality which relate to political participation, as well as production, distribution and consumption of wealth, which is largely determined by the various and frequently-competing ideologies within a given society must be brought under surveillance.

Hence, clergy of different religions in Nigeria should educate and socialize their members on proper ideology in order to avert constant blood- letting in the name of religion.
Politically, the Nigerian leadership should perform its socio-economic responsibilities to the masses. The government should embark on social welfare programmes and education, like the Almajiri education policy in the North, to de-radicalize the youth and counter their violent extremist ideology. Economically, had Nigeria tread the path of industrialization as Malaysia, India and China or even Singapore and the wealth is distributed to the different sections and strata of society and citizens, grievances that brought about terrorism and militancy would have been averted.

The bottom line remains that good governance must be instituted such that the issues that predispose the groups to challenge the state can be resolved. The sense in which Nigeria leaders equate security with the accumulation of sophisticated weapons and hardware must be discouraged. Emphasis should rather be on providing leverages for ameliorating the socio-economic hardship that daily confronts the people. The desire of the United States of America (USA), France, and The Great Britain governments to collaborate with the Nigerian authorities is a welcome development. Terrorism is not a fight that can be left for an individual country to fight, basically because the result of such attacks may cut across nationalities. The attack on the UN building in Nigeria, for example, left in its toll the death of both Nigerians and foreigners alike.

Conclusion

Conflict and strife usually result where an individual is denied the freedom to participate in the political decision-making processes of the society. Politics in Nigeria has become a prerogative of the rich and until it is reversed, militancy and terrorism will persist. Man, being a political animal, always sees himself as such and as being free to engage in politics, formally or informally. Hence, he assumes a frustration-aggression mechanism in connecting deprivation to violence. Violence is always a response to frustration. And writing about the greater probability of violence inherent in a sudden increase in deprivation, the psychological basis lies in the frustration of basic needs, a frustration induced by the sudden reversal in gratifications.

An oppressed man may withdraw tactically, strategically or voluntarily for psychological or other reasons like unfulfilled expectations where the prevailing conditions are not conducive to his participation in the political process. In this latter circumstance of withdrawal, especially where it is involuntary, the man is said to be politically alienated from society. Political alienation of the individual person or of a group or segment of society breeds conflict and unrest. In observing, contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks upon the government. For instance, in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous, they may see themselves as the strong party; and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the masses, disorder and anarchy may prevails. Hence, political

alienation or contempt can be manifested by both the rich and the poor, and in some instances, simultaneously.

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