

CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF OAU'S DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTIONS IN THE POST COLONIAL CHADIAN CRISIS FROM (1965 TO 1979)

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ABSTRACT

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), is known for its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, yet it believed that only through peace and security can development be guaranteed in the continent. Emerging civil wars within African states had created several theatres of conflict that put not only the international status of the OAU to test, but also its commitment to peace and security in Africa. One of such conflict was the Chadian Civil War of 1965 to 1979. The war had become intractable as it spilled over to other countries with refugee problems. This ugly development, for the first time, challenged the OAU non-interference principle especially when external bodies like France, Libya, the United State of America and the Soviet Union interfered and escalated the crisis. This paper assessed the OAU's roles of diplomatic intervention in the crisis. The paper relied on secondary sources to examine the diplomatic interventions that the OAU applied and the extent to which the intervention was successful within the ambit of non-interference principle. The study found that the Chadian civil war was more than internal crisis; and the OAU's inability to intervene forcefully to end the crisis was due to the self-constraining clause in its charter, even when the involvement of foreign countries created grounds for access to arms for the warring factions, and harvest of death for the ordinary Chadians. Based on these findings, the study recommended the need for AU to strengthen his collective security protocol, and to have a stand by peace keeping force that can intervene in crises situations in Africa.

Keywords: Chadian crisis, Colonialism, Diplomatic intervention, OAU.

ABSTRAIT

L'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA), aujourd'hui Union africaine (UA), est connue pour son principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États membres, mais elle pensait que ce n'est que par la paix et la sécurité que le développement peut être garanti sur le continent. Les guerres civiles émergentes au sein des États africains ont créé plusieurs théâtres de conflit qui

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mettent non seulement à l'épreuve le statut international de l'OUA, mais aussi son attachement à la paix et à la sécurité en Afrique. L'un de ces conflits a été la guerre civile tchadienne de 1965 à 1979. La guerre était devenue insoluble alors qu'elle se propageait à d'autres pays connaissant des problèmes de réfugiés. Cette horrible évolution, pour la première fois, a remis en cause le principe de non-ingérence de l'OUA, en particulier lorsque des organismes extérieurs comme la France, la Libye, les États-Unis d'Amérique et l'Union soviétique ont intervenus et ont aggravé la crise. Ce document a évalué les rôles de l'OUA en matière d'intervention diplomatique dans la crise. Le document s'est appuyé sur des sources secondaires pour examiner les interventions diplomatiques que l'OUA a appliquées et la mesure dans laquelle l'intervention a réussi dans le cadre du principe de non-ingérence. L'étude a révélé que la guerre civile tchadienne était plus qu'une crise interne; et l'incapacité de l'OUA à intervenir avec force pour mettre fin à la crise était due à la clause d'auto-limitation contenue dans sa charte, même lorsque l'implication de pays étrangers créait des motifs d'accès aux armes pour les factions belligérantes et de récoltes de morts pour les Tchadiens ordinaires. Sur la base de ces résultats, l'étude a recommandé la nécessité pour l'UA de renforcer son protocole de sécurité collective et d'avoir une force de maintien de la paix en mesure d'intervenir dans les situations de crise en Afrique.

Mots-clés: crise tchadienne, colonialisme, intervention diplomatique, OUA.

INTRODUCTION

The main aim of the founding fathers of Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), now known as African Union (AU) was the maintenance of peace and unity in Africa. In spite of its recognition of the important peace and security, the OAU had committed itself to the principle of "Non-interference: in the internal crisis of member states. At the commencement of the Chadian civil war, the OAU Executive Committee had noted that Chad's problem was a political one and therefore needed a political solution. Unfortunately, the OAU did nothing to midwife immediate political solution, thus allowing the crisis to go on for 15 years (1965 – 1979).

Different reasons have been offered for lack of immediate response to crisis in Africa by the OAU, and in particular the Chadian crisis. While some of the reasons were traced to the inadequacies of the OAU Charter, other reasons are traced to the lack of commitment of the member states. According to Uzoma (2015) the 32 African countries that formed OAU in 1963 were mostly newly independence African states, apart from Ethiopia (which was never colonized), The Chadian war that commenced in 1965 was therefore, the first challenge that could test the faithfulness of the Organization to its principle of non-interference, and the diplomatic skills of conflict resolution. Beside these, the legacy left by France, the Chadian Colonial Master, had prepared and oiled the ground for crisis in the newly independent state. As shown in table 1 (about here), the style of government and the practices associated with it had prepared political elites who would hold more allegiance to France than to Chad and its people. In this context the manipulation of the leadership was possible for any opposition or dissenting voice against France.

Table 1 presents in a summary the Colonial government practices that created Chadian citizens that were to more accountable to France after independence than to Chad Republic itself. It also shows the practices (assimilation/or association) that was to create and watered the seed of discord among Chadian North and South after independence. Little wonder, therefore, that few years after

the Chadian independence, the bubble burst; the seed of conflict that was to change the face of Chad had germinated.

Table 1: Governance styles and Practices by France Colonial master in Chad


Style	Practices
Basic theory	Assimilation/Association
Government	Federation: Government – General (centralization of administration) Assimilation: Traditional boundaries and rulers destroyed system both inter community clashes.
Economic	Exploitation of resources and large-scale alienation of land to European settlers. Supplying of arms and lights weapons to fuel conflict.
Social freedom	Much force labour and basic freedom; denied indigene quality and control of government,
Education	Educated elite was better treated than the youths and non-educated ones
Attitude to African	Fraternal
Parliament policy	The French territories were represented in the National Assembly in Paris. The French were more determined to hang on to their colonies

Source: Thatcher (1974) French rule in colonial era

As Garuba (1998, p. 6) would argue, the “ill of colonialism are no doubt, many and varied, but the most pronounce ones consisted of the balkanization of the African continent with the concomitant border problems. The divide and rule system of the colonial era, which set the chiefs and the people against one another; the acculturation policies of colonial powers which displaced the traditional system without insuring the imbibement of the enforced alien system; and the displacement of leadership succession pattern, and the replacement with electoral process that is full of deceipts. In many instances, the abandonment of traditional, pre-colonial conflict management practices resulted in many African societies having prolong conflicts before tribunals and courts that would not give credible judgement.

The Chadian crisis became an eye opener to the seed of conflict sown by the Colonial France masters, and a conflict that the newly formed OAU needed to solve. This study provides an historical discourse of the crisis, with the aim of assessing factors that make the conflict to last for 15 years, the diplomatic skills employed by the OAU to find solution to it, and the lessons learn in conflict resolution by the emerging African Union. The work is presented in themes, Following this introduction is the presentation of the Chadian situation; next is the historical review of the Chadian crisis, and the OAU diplomatic interventions. The study ends with conclusion and recommendations

The Study Location: Chad



Source:www.geographicguide.com; Fig 1: Map of Chad

The Republic of Chad is surrounded by 6 African countries: Nigeria, Cameroun, Central African republic, Sudan, Niger, and Libya. As part of the decentralization of government, Chad is divided into 32 regions. Apart from the capital city of N'djadema, the regions include Batha, Chari-Baguirmi, Hadjer-Lamis, Wadi-Fira, Bahr el Gazel, Borkou, Ennedi, Guera, kanem, Lac, logone Occidental, logone Oriental, Mandoul, Mayo-Kebbi est, Mayo-Kebbi Ouest, Moyen-Chari, Quaddar, Salamat, Sila, Tandjile, and Tibesti. Each of the region is headed by a governor, who is appointed by the Presidents.

As shown in Figure 1, the Republic of Chad is a landlocked state in the North Central Africa. The country's terrain is that of a shallow basin that rises gradually from Lake Chad area in the west and ruined by mountains to the north, east and south. Harrison, Clark and Henderson (1997) affirmed that Chad is the fifth largest country on the African continent and most of her population lives by agriculture. Cotton is grown in the south, while cattle is reared in the north and in the central region. In spite of these agricultural production, Chad remains, one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. Most Chadians live in poverty as subsistence herders and farmers. Since 2003 crude oil has become the country's primary source of export earnings, superseding the traditional cotton industry.

In the analysis provided by Thatcher (1974), Chad became an autonomous republic within France colonial community in 1946. An independent movement led by the first premier Tombabaye achieved complete independence on August 11, 1960. When the civil war broke out, and become intractable, all the surrounding African states had a feel of it. This was either through

the displacement of people who became refugees, or infiltration of dissident soldiers. Given these situations, other African states and non-African states became involved in the Chadian crisis. At this time, it was no longer expedient for the OAU to continue to remain on the fence with its non-interference posture.

Ibrahim and Sambaris (2000) described civil war as an armed conflict that can cause more than 1000 deaths; challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; involved the state as one of the principal combinations; included rebels with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after and of the war. Furthermore, Eke (1972) contended that African post-colonial states in Africa live and work within two often opposing "publics". The first is the civil public, and the second, the primordial public. The citizens owe no allegiance or moral obligation to the civil public, but to the primordial public, where he or she owes total allegiance and is obligated to make benefit from one's position. The Republic of Chad, like any other African state, has pockets of large and small ethnic groups (primordial public) which the citizen owes strong allegiance to (more than 200 distinct ethnic groups, which create diverse social structures). The central government (the civil public) has a little or no attraction to the citizens except for representation where members of the different ethnic groups struggle to take as much as they can for their personal benefit and that of their group members. These characteristics serve to weaken Chad. In the face of disagreement among the political elites (Soldiers and Civilians), exploitation and mismanagement of resources, Chad became a cold war proxy confrontation.

In addition to the observation of Eke (1972), Edeko (2003) observed that African states are living in rapidly deteriorating infrastructure, rising unemployment, rampant corruption and economic mismanagement by kleptocratic bureaucratic and political oligarchies. This may as well be attributed to the civil public mentioned by Eke (1972). The barriers which have kept African countries underdeveloped seem to be the unhealthy political institutions and the exclusive, illiberal disposition, ethnic nationalities and religious extremists. By adopting these theoretical lenses, the study argued that the Republic of Chad must reconcile the contest between the forces of fragmentation, that causes the civil war crisis, and the imperative of integration.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CHADIAN CRISIS

Since independence, the Republic of Chad has been involved in a complex web of domestic problems, resulting in civil-war. The war could be traced to the political, socio-economic and cultural problems which Chad inherited from France, its colonial master. The French dealings with her colonies adopted a policy of divide and rule which has greatly contributed to internal crisis that plague many French colonies. According to Imobighe (2003), the Chadian Civil War involved eleven factions. The factions included Forces Armées Tchadiennes (FAT), led by Félix Mallum and Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), led by Goukouni Weddeye, Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), led by Hissène Habré, Mouvement populaire pour la libération du Tchad (MPLT) led by Abubakar Abderamane, Forces populaires de libération (FPL) led by Mahamet Abba, Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire (CDR) led by Ahimat Acyl, FROLINAT Original, led by Abba Siddick, Forces Armées occidentales (FAO), led by Hadjaro Sanoussi, Volcan, led by Abdoulaye Adam Dana; and Union Nationale Démocratique (UND) formed by a group of intellectual facilitators.

Isicher (1977) averred that French colonial administration advocated of assimilation but regardless of consistency, they were prepared to extend it only to a tiny group and even this group reacted violent against the loss of identity which assimilation implied, and developed in reaction to the philosophy of negritude. However, the southerners were more receptive to the principle of assimilation than the northerners, and therefore more acceptable to work with the French policy of assimilation. The colonialists, therefore, patronized them with government appointment, and leadership authority with some control. This led to uneven development of north and south. After independence, the inequality of socio-economic development escalates eventually to a conflict between the north and south.

Religious factor also contributed to the Chadian crisis. Chad is a religiously diverse country. Estimates from Pew Research Center in 2010 found that 55.7% of the population was Muslim, while 22.5% was Catholic and a further 17.6% was Protestant. Among the Muslims, 48% professed to be Sunni, 21% Shia, 4% Ahmadi and 23% just Muslim. A small proportion of the population continues to practice indigenous religions. Animism includes a variety of ancestor and place-oriented religions whose expression is highly specific. Islam is expressed in diverse ways; for example, 55% of Muslim Chadians belong to Sufi orders. Religion, therefore become another factor that greatly destroyed the fragile unity that existed in Chad. It led to breakdown of peace as the Muslims who make up the bulk of the Chadian population refused to accept what they termed Christian or southern domination. The southerner's domination of the governmental institution and military life of Chad is strongly resisted by the northerners.

Politically, Chad obtained independence from France under the leadership of François Tombalbaye. His government was to face serious opposition from the north. There were several allegations of electoral malpractices by political opponents. The situation became worse when the President dissolved all political parties, and declared Chad a one-party state.

Another factor that contributed to the crisis in Chad was the land taxation laws of the country. Peasants were made to pay high rents for their holdings regardless of the degree on fertility of the land. This constituted an additional burden on a class of people already dissatisfied with their socio-economic positions. In 1965 the peasants of Mengaline revolted against the oppressive taxation laws. The peasant of Ouddai revolted in 1966, while in 1961, the peasants of Salomat follow suit. All these revolts showed the degree of resentment by peasantry. It was the 1965 Mengalme revolt that gave birth to the front for the National Liberation of Chad (NLC). The NLC led by Ibrahim Abatcha, a northern man, constituted itself into a terror to the government of Tombalbaye. It was not long when the FROLINAT which was formed in Sudan by some northerners, joined the opposition militants to confront the government of The FROLINAT succeeded, in instigating violence which led to the intervention of the army.

The entry of FROLINAT into the Chadian struggle resulted in widespread reawakening and resurgence of primordial identities across Chad. FROLINAT, thus became the greatest threat to the administration of Tombalbaye. It not only instigated revolts, but also led to intervention of the army which terminated the presidency of François Tombalbaye and his eventual death in hands in his military chiefs.

In the midst of the internal crisis, Chad also had a boundary problem with Libya over the mineral rich Aousu strip. Although many political commentators have argued that the Chad-Libyan crisis was masterminded by some Chadian opposition from the north who wanted the Libyan support in their battle against the government at N'djamena (Orbator, 1984), other thought

the Chadian army itself was becoming discontented with the government policies (Imobigbhe, 2003). General Felix Malloum, the successor of Francois Tombalbaye also contributed to the Chadian crisis by trying to rectify the mistakes done by the administration of Tombalbaye, His patronization of the north with official posts was viewed with mixed feeling in Chad that eventually culminated in a physical confrontation between of the forces of Malloum and Hissene Habre, which open her to the involvement of external forces in Chad.

It was after the open involvement of Libya in the Chadian crisis, that the OAU started to have a rethink on its earlier decision that the Chadian crisis was an internal problem that should not be interfered with. In the OAU meeting in Libreville, Libyan involvement in the Chad crisis was officially debated a position taken that “Libya involved herself in Chad because she wants to create a puppet neighbour state. It was obvious that the Chadian crisis was no longer a north and south conflicts but an internationalize conflict involving Libya, France, United State of America and the Soviet Union. While Libya seek to create a government in Chad that can conceded the rich oil area of Aousu to it, France, united State and the Soviet Union created market for arms and ammunition sales.

After the Libreville OAU Meeting, African states started to wade into the Chadian crisis. For instance, in 1978, Sudan decided to wade in as a conciliator of peace efforts, which resulted in the Khartoum Accord of 1978. The Accord brought Malloum and Habre together. However, peace was still elusive in Chad. In 1979, Nigeria waded into it through the Lagos Agreement. This was in response to Nigeria’s concentric circle foreign policy, which defines Nigeria’s engagement with the outside world: West Africa first, Africa second and the global arena as the third sphere. Given this priority order, Nigeria waded into the Chadian crisis after the failure of the Sudan effort. The Biafran experience had taught the country a hard lesson that if your immediate neighbours are not happy with you, or you do not command their trust and respect, your search for regional or global power will be hollow and wild goose chase. Unfortunately, like other attempts, the Lagos Agreement did not yield a desired peace in Chad.

An Appraisal of OAU'S Diplomatic Intervention

The Chadian crisis had generated a profound interest not only in Africa but also in the international scene as there were outside involvement in the crisis. The attempt of the OAU to live up to expectation and contain the rather volatile situation developed through general summits and resolutions. One of the major problems for Africa in the 1960-1980 era were civil wars born of tribal or ideology conflict, many of which had cold war implications. Therefore, in order to appraise the OAU’s role in the crisis, it would be instructive to look at its role in terms of the world expectations from OAU and its stand on a peaceful and conflict-free Africa. In this context our narrative is on what the O.A.U ought to have done vis-a-vis what it actually did in the face of the crisis that confronted Chad. Cervenka (1977) stated that the “OAU Charter emphasizes the defense of the sovereignty territorial integrity and independence of member states, but the Charter did not provide for a collective security which would have enabled member states to be legally obliged to come to the assistance of another member state in the event of an aggression. Such weak point in the Charter explained the obvious fact why OAU did not provide for the co-ordination of African states, for military intervention support to achieve the desirable objectives of sustainable peace and security early in the Chadian crisis.

In many instances, the United Nations had to call on the OAU to resolve the Chadian crisis and help in bringing peace and unity not only to Chad but also other troubling parts of Africa. The failure of the OAU to fulfill these expectations had earned it much criticism within Africa and international circles. Many had seen the inability of the OAU to solve the Chadian crises as a result of its interpretation of its Charter which favours inaction. Shaw (1983, p.151) opined that the OAU Commission for Mediation, Conciliation, Arbitration only create an opportunity or a conducive atmosphere for parties involved in a dispute to come together and resolve it; this is usually done through a third party. This is the OAU is made up of independent state; the Commission, therefore has no coercive powers because many African heads of state guard their territorial integrity jealously.

These criticisms seem to have overlooked the basis of the foundation of the OAU. It is a well known fact that in the appraisal or evaluation of an international organization, if the rules guiding the movements and activities are ignored, the appraisal will end up in a bias and flimsy conclusions. According to Reynolds (1973) all international organizations such as the OAU are charged with objectives at its inception which are formerly idealistic in principles. The principles are however, related to the achievement of a new political order. To evaluate such an organization it would be necessary, to examine not only its political antecedents, and contexts but also ideas which influence their institutions which are embodied in them. In the light of the above, no constructive appraisal can be made of the role of the O.A.U, in the Chadian crisis without viewing its actions within the context of its charter. Those that viewed the OAU's achievements within the provisions of its Charter expected very little from the organization and did not want the OAU to take any action that fall outside the provisions of its Charter. The OAU settles dispute among its members by direct negotiation between states, good offices offered by third parties and Ad hoc committee composed of Head of states, and diplomatic negotiation conducted during sessions of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government.

The OAU Charter, provides for the resolution of conflicts through conciliation mediation and arbitration. It did does not provide any structure for the handling of disputes within member states; only the handling of disputes between states is provided for. Besides, had the OAU decided to go beyond its Charter provisions to intervene forcefully in the Chadian war, it is possible that it could not have gone too far because of the enormous problems that confronted it internally and externally. Moreover, the OAU Charter did not make any provision for an African high command which could enforce its resolutions. Therefore, for a constructive appraisal of the OAU's achievements in Chad, the provisions of its charter in relation to conflicts resolution is examined here.

The OAU charter which, states the sovereignty equality of all members and the non-interference in the internal affairs of member state were made in order to forestall the irredentist polices of some African heads of state, and subversive actions respectively. The Chadian civil war, therefore, put the two principles of the OAU Charter to test. These were the principles of non--interference in the internal affairs of member states and the inalienable right of its members to independent existence. Therefore, the OAU diplomatic intervention in Africa conflict is motivated particularly by geopolitical interest and sustainable peace development.

The non-interference clause of the OAU's Charter restricted the extent to which the organization could have intervened in the Chadian Crisis. The clause made the OAU to tread cautiously so that it did not overstep its limits and be accused of negating the principles of its

Charter. At all the OAU meetings on the Chadian crisis, for fear of being accused of interference in the internal affairs of its member states, the organization waited for a long time before deciding to intervene. When it finally decided to do so following the intensification of the crisis, the non-interference clause hindered the OAU's involvement and restricted it to summits and resolutions which the warring parties of Chad gave little or no attention. In addition, because of its Charter provision, the OAU only used the diplomacy of persuasion since it did not possess its own force. The failure of this diplomacy of persuasion was due to the external involvement and interest in the Chadian crisis.

Arguably, the non-interference principle of the OAU went a long way in crippling the organization in its peace initiatives and efforts in Chad. It was ineffective. While claiming non-interference, the OAU still found nothing wrong in criticizing the role played by the warring factions in fuelling the Chadian crisis. They failed to see this condemnation as interference in the internal affair of Chad. Therefore, one can safely say that the Charter of the OAU is ambiguous in the light of the above argument.

The Organization of Africa Unity has the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in African states by engagement in conflict prevention and resolution through his protocols and commissions. Kamanu (1974, p.364) stated that the OAU finds it convenient to hide under the non-interference provision of its Charter to avoid facing up to the difficult issues raised by secessionist conflicts and civil war. That is the non-interference provision which prevents it from taking effective action in disputes resolution does not prevent the organization from taking sides. African state refused to recognized any right in international law of succession in relation to independent states, whether or not at manifestation of the umbrella principle of self determination.

The same Charter which prevents the OAU from getting involved in the internal affairs of its member states also pledged it to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members. How then could the OAU have defended successfully Chad's territorial integrity and sovereignty without interfering in her internal-affairs? The OAU charter and the way it settles crises in African is that the resolutions to be adopted by the conflicting parties are not binding on them because the charter did not make any provision for that.

However, despite the fact that the Chadian crisis had purely internal origins, it ceased to be an internal affair when France, Soviet Union and the United States become involved in the conflict. Lebow (1987) viewed that the interest of the African States and their involvement in Chad took the war beyond what could be regarded as an internal affair of Chad. This view was shared by many African states and non-African states alike who felt that the Chadian crisis had become so complex that was no more the internal affair of Chad. They viewed the Chadian crisis as a private business that had developed into a public nuisance. Some therefore suggested that the OAU would be in a better position to act if it could frame its own interference clause like that of the United Nation Organization.

The United Nations non-interference provision does not operate where there is a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. While this suggestion is plausible, it should be realized that the OAU unlike the UN has no provisions for collective security, it cannot therefore, enforce its resolutions on its members. The effectiveness of the organization depends on the willingness of the member states to cooperate and when this willingness diminishes as it did Chad with the refusal of GoukouniWeddeye to adopt the organizations resolutions, the OAU could do nothing.

As Williams (1987) further revealed, international crisis have been divided into three categories. These are intramural crisis, intra-alliance crises and adversary crises. Intramural crisis occurs between states that had thing in common; e.g, between Senegal and Mauritanian. On the other hand, intra-alliance crises occur between allies who disagrees on fundamental issues e.g. Guinea and Mali. Lastly, adversary crisis happens between enemy or rival state e.g. Libya and Chad. In as much as one condemns the OAU non-interference clause, one should also appreciate the fact that since this principle has been entrenched in the Charter without provisions for exceptions, the organization could have done nothing. Moreover, had the OAU ignored this clause, it would have had a disastrous effect on the organization. This is because many African states signed the Charter at Addis Ababa in May 1963 on the grounds and understanding that the organization would not interfere in their internal affairs. So for the OAU to have suddenly scrapped this clause in favour of an active involvement in what was regarded as the internal affair of a member state, would have destroyed the basis on which the OAU was founded. Besides the O.A.U, could not have done anything by getting involved in the Chadian crisis without invitation "by the warring factions or a member of the warring factions.

Further reason that greatly limited the OAU's achievements in the Chadian crisis was the internal problems which included lack of fund, petty jealousies amongst member states and the absence of a standing army which could have helped in enforcing OAU's resolutions on her member states. Initially when the OAU decided to intervene in the Chadian crisis, it received financial aid from France and the United States but as the crisis deepened and become more complex the OAU was left with little or no fund which would have helped in making its efforts a great success. Lack of fund coupled with the fact that many Africa states are poor greatly hindered the OAU's peace efforts. This factor seemed to have contributed more than any other in limiting the achievements of the OAU. In Chad like in Nigerian civil war and Ethiopian-Somali dispute, the OAU members were divided on religious ground because, Muslims members of OAU supported follow Muslims in any conflict and helped them to lobby for support. The Christians also helped their fellow Christians. In the case of Chad while the Muslim members of OAU supported a ruler from the north the Christians on their own part supported rulers from the Christian dominated south.

Religious affiliated support among OAU member states, suggests that little or no room was given to fair play and justice by the OAU, Lack of unity and trust amongst the African leaders in the OAU was also a contributory factor in the ineffectiveness of the OAU The African leaders did not rise in unionism and maintain one stand on how OAU should go about her responsibility of resolving the Chadian crisis. The absence of a standing army which the OAU could have used in enforcing its resolutions also undermined its peace efforts at resolving the Chadian crisis. As already indicated the OAU peace keeping force contributed by Benin, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire was pulled out when the situation became aggravated. External factor played its part in limiting the OAU's peace efforts in Chad. Since the formation of the OAU the Western powers had not taken- kindly to it especially as it was established to help in the decolonization of the African continent. So when the Chadian crisis was intensified the Western powers put the OAU to test by their direct involvement in an African affair.

CONCLUSION

The Chadian crisis had its genesis in French colonial policies in West Africa areas occupied by

them. As the colonial master of Chad, the French introduced a rule known as assimilation policy that well later changes to association. The policy favoured the southerners at the expense of the northerners. These contributed to political, religious and socio-economic consequence of Chadian civil war. In spite of the existence of OAU, now AU, as an umbrella body of independence African State, with the avowed objective of securing peace and security in Africa, the Chad civil war went on for 15 years (1965 -1979). This is attributed to the fact that the OAU Charter enshrined in it provisions that prevent interference in internal crisis of member states.

The notion of state sovereignty and the challenge to establish new rules to govern international organization's intervention in the affairs of sovereign state whose activities challenge the existence of others, and or/even citizens of the state is currently receiving international recognition, with the United Nations leading. America's intervention in the Iraq and Kuwait wars can be cited as example. Nigeria with its concentric foreign policy intervened in the Liberian crisis. However, Chad was left for 15 years in a war that did not killed her citizens but left the country looted by different factions of militants, and rendered it almost a failed state, with the OAU looking the other way while France, America and Russia sold arms.

The wind of change has come with the birth of AU in 2002. Of course, the AU wind of change has opened the gate of hope and optimism to shape the destiny of African states.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. International organization should support African narratives of AU capability by strengthening the security mechanism to ensure the realization of African solutions for African problems.
2. The functionality of international institution is to enhance the performance of foreign policy objective of African state and to protect the society from the anti-democratic tendencies and deviant behaviour of political leaders that tried to manipulate the populace.
3. The AU should give voice to the voiceless; empower the poor and venerable African states, encouraging the marginalized segments of the society to be actively involved in changing their circumstances and highlight the plight of those often missing from mainstream leadership.
4. The formation of African High Command, and or standby army that can intervene to protect and rescue AU member countries and citizens from opportunist coupists and totalitarian dictators will be a welcome development.

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